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Regulation and Barriers to Trade 






Recent advances in telecommunications, particularly using fibre technologies, permit many 
services based on data-processing to be performed anywhere in the world. They thus become 
tradable and subject to the laws of comparative advantage. A good example is data-processing 
within large multi-national corporations, the integrated performance of which can reduce cost 
and add considerable value. Whereas a single market for the provision of such services has 
arisen in the US, the equivalent single market in the European Union is impeded by absent or 
imperfect regulation conducted at the national level, which fails to create a level playing field 
between the country’s former telecommunications monopolist and foreign competitors and 
prevents the emergence of trade in services, at considerable potential cost to firms operating 
in the EU. The paper discusses how this problem can be resolved by improved regulatory 
practice and evaluates the prospects for institutional change, in the form of more centralised 
scrutiny of regulatory remedies, which would make this more achievable. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Imagine Idaho were a state in a 27-member ‘Second life’ union of states of varying sizes.  
It has its own recently liberalised telecommunications sector, consisting primarily of an 
historic monopolist whose network is confined to the state; all interstate calls being 
accomplished via interconnection with another operator. 
 
Telecommunications purchasers in ‘Idaho’ consist of four categories: households, intra-
state businesses, businesses, such as ‘Wal-Mart’, which operate in other states as well, 
and firms whose activities girdle the earth (ie embrace multiple federal states), such as 
Microsoft, BP and Mittal Steel.  The requirements of the four categories are different: the 
first two need little in the way of value-added services; the third and fourth have 




How can competition develop, especially for the larger types of customer? 
 
One possible outcome is autarchy.  Services for all customers are produced and 
consumed within the state, in a way which restricts data-processing to a low-scale 
inefficient operation. 
                                                      
2 We confine ourselves in this paper to discussion of such ‘corporate services’, but the connection between 
them and – for example – the provision of telecommunications services to support activities such as 
banking and gambling is a close one. 
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A second is ‘free trade’, by which we mean that services can be produced in one state 
(the exporter) and consumed in another.
3  Clearly, each type of customer has a different 
proportion of services which are tradable.  In the case of the first two, it might be a low 
percentage, confined to customers near the state’s borders.  In the third and fourth, it 
might be 50%.  But almost all goods and services exhibit a similar dichotomy of value 
added into traded (e.g. manufacturing) and non-tradable (e.g. local distribution and 
retailing). 
 
The third outcome is the construction of non-tariff barriers to trade, implemented via the 
presence or absence of regulation.  The precedents for this being accomplished via 
positive regulatory intervention are very wide: fears (substantiated or otherwise) about 
technologies such as GM food; environmental regulations related to carbon-emitting 
equipment, and so on.  But barriers can equally be created by the failure to regulate 
adequately at state level, possibly by a regulator which is captured by a local incumbent,  
 
Federal authorities may seek to correct such failures. In the ‘real’ Idaho, this has been 
accomplished by the principle of federal pre-emption by the FCC.  But things are rather 
different in the only too ‘real’ European Union, where there are indeed 27 member states 
of varying sizes each with its own historic monopolist owning a network typically 
                                                      
3 In other words, in the terminology of General Agreements on Trade in Services (Article 1.2) ‘the supply 
of services from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member’.  Another on the four 
modes of trade in services is ‘by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member’ – i.e. foreign direct investment. The other two are noted in Section 3 below. 
MEC1636  3confined to the state’s territory, a raft of smaller competitors relying on domestic (or 
more rarely foreign) direct investment, and its own national regulatory agency.   The land 
areas and populations of the EU and the USA are comparable.  European competition law 
has a ‘pre-emption’ on matters affecting interstate trade, provided the other conditions for 
intervention are also fulfilled.  But compared with the Single Market of the USA, the EU 
Single Market in telecommunications services is something of a sham. 
 
The consequences of this might be far-reaching. The deficiencies of European 
productivity growth when measured by US standards have been analysed in articles with 
titles such as ‘why was Europe left at the station when America’s productivity 
locomotive departed?’  (Gordon 2004).  Analysis by Bryan Williamson (in Basilisco et 
al, 2007, Part 2, Ch.4) reviews and analyses the contribution to this differential made by 
ICT investment.  He finds that in the US, overall productivity growth rose dramatically 
after 1995, with the largest part of the increase attributable to intensive ICT-using private 
services.  In the 15 member states of the European Union in 2004, by contrast, 
productivity growth fell after 1995, and the contribution of intensive ICT-using private 
services is about one third of that in the US. 
 
Williamson goes on to speculate about the contribution of networked companies to 
productivity growth, citing evidence of various kinds that the use of computers and the 
extent of computer networks are complements – leading to the conclusion that the 
communications networks which permit the networking play an important role, in 
conjunction with human capital, in enabling the effective use of ICT investment. The 
MEC1636  4communications networks are the indispensable vector of the data, the analysis of which 
permits the productivity improvement. We seek to analyse this hypothesis below. 
 
Section 2 describes the technological changes which have increased the tradability of, 
especially, corporate data-processing services carried by communications networks. 
Section 3 outlines problems in the measurement of trade in telecommunications services. 
Section 4 discusses the consequences of defective regulation of telecommunications 
services, while section 5 considers possible institutional remedies affecting regulation. 
 
2. Defying  gravity 
 
It is commonplace to explain the extent of trade via a gravity model (Krugman and Obstfeld 
2006, p.11-17).  Newton’s law of universal gravitation held that attractive force between two 
objects was given by the product of their two masses divided by the square of the distance 
between them, multiplied by the gravitational constant. 
 
Economists are a little less precise, allowing for the volume of trade to be determined  by the 
product of the sizes of the economies, each raised to a power, and divided by the distance 
between them  also raised to a  power. The powers and the constant term are estimated from the 
data, and a bunch of additional factors such as the existence of national boundaries is thrown in 
too. 
 
MEC1636  5However, in telecommunications, gravity is increasingly being defied as a result of new 
developments in, especially, long distance communications; in another popular metaphor, we are 
seeing the death of distance. 
 
Cost structures for fixed telecommunications networks are characterised by: 
 
•  Material fixed costs,  in both core and access networks; and 
•  Non-zero marginal costs of service provision. 
 
This is true both for circuit-switched PSTN networks, and also leased line and data networks 
underpinning the provision of services to corporate clients. 
 
However, network technology developments in recent years – and specifically the use of Internet 
Protocol (IP) to underpin the deployment of IP-based Next Generation Networks (NGNs) – will 
play a key role in service provision going forward, both in terms of the breadth of the service 
portfolio and the underlying costs of service provision. 
 
There is no single, optimal IP-based NGN: the appropriate development and deployment of new 
networks will depend on a numbers of factors specific to each operator and jurisdiction, such as 
the business plans of the operator in question, the extent of existing and prospective competition, 
the performance capabilities of the existing network and the investment required to upgrade or 
replace.  However, in general terms, there are two forms of IP-based network development (for 
fixed network operators): the core NGN and the access NGN (often referred to as Next 
Generation Access, or NGA). 
 
MEC1636  6The core NGN involves the replacement of existing core switching and transmission equipment 
with IP-based routers capable of supporting Voice over IP (VoIP), multimedia and other packet-
based services.  A key feature is the replacement of the existing plethora of different networks 
developed to provide different services – leased lines, voice conveyance etc. – with a single 
multi-service network.  This can involve significant rationalisation and simplification of the 
existing core network structure with deployment of fewer nodes and prospectively fewer points of 
interconnection (PoIs) with other operators, as well as the distribution of network intelligence 
(e.g. routing and signalling) towards a core structure of ‘soft switches’, routers and multi-service 
access nodes (MSANs) and away from the traditional model characterised by a switching 
hierarchy with switching elements towards the periphery of the core network.  The NGA typically 
builds on the core NGN principles but extends this to development of the access network to 
involve investment in deployment of fibre deeper into the access network (for example Fibre to 
the Node (FttN) or Fibre to the Home (FttH)) in order to provide higher speed access to end users.  
 
Such developments have established a basis for (i) reduction the overall costs of telecoms service 
provision and (ii) a reduction in the marginal cost of providing call and data services.  These cost 
reductions have resulted from: 
 
•  the conveyance efficiency of packet- compared with traditional circuit-switched 
technology (as well as the IP protocol representing an efficient packet-based solution); 
and 
MEC1636  7•  the multi-service nature of NGNs, wherein the previous multiple networks to support a 
wide range of services – voice, data, etc – are combined into one multi-service network, 
allowing for increased exploitation of scale and scope economies.
4 
 






































Traditionally, network costs are a function of (i) volume (whether lines, call or data volumes) and 
(ii) distance.  In the context of the deployment of next generation networks, however, there has 
been much discussion of the ‘death of distance’, i.e., the tendency of marginal costs to tend to 
zero (or at least very low levels) such that the costs of traffic conveyance are invariant to the 
distances over which such traffic is conveyed.  Whilst NGN deployment may not represent the 
                                                      
4 For example, BT is in the process of investing 10 billion GBP to replace its existing 17 networks with one 
multi-service ’21 Century Network’. 
MEC1636  8‘death’ of distance, it is accepted to provide the ability to reduce the distance-related costs.  The 
consequence of lower (if not zero) distance-related costs is a greater opportunity to exploit the 
principles of comparative advantage across countries in providing value-added services since the 
costs of distance represent less of a factor in the costs of production. 
 
There are two fundamental consequences from the above: 
 
1.  cross-border trade in value-added services is increasingly viable with reduction in the 
costs of distance; and 
2.  such trade will, absent barriers, provide a basis for efficient provision of services, 
reflecting the comparative advantage of different regions or countries. 
 
Indeed, to the extent that NGNs represent a complete death of distance, value added services will 
– absent barriers or distortions – be created in the region or country with comparative advantage.  
And even where NGNs fall short of removing all distance-related costs, they still represent an 
opportunity for improvement in efficiency since they reduce the extent of comparative advantage 
or increasing returns to scale required in order to make it worthwhile to provide the value-added 
element of services in an alternative location.  For example, assume with traditional telecoms 
technology that country A is able to produce a service at a cost of 100 cents, and that conveyance 
costs between countries A and B are 20 cents.  Under such a scenario, providers of the service in 
country A would source the service from country B only where country B was able to produce it 
for 80 cents or less, such that the cost of service from country B including conveyance is below 
that of production in country A.  However, with the introduction of IP-based NGN technology 
and the consequence reduction in distance-related costs, the ‘hurdle’ for country B’s comparative 
advantage falls: with the full death of distance, countries A and B compete directly in the 
provision of the service with geographic location being an irrelevance; even with a reduction (but 
MEC1636  9no eradication) of distance-related costs, country B needs be more effective at producing the 
service than country A but not to the same extent at under the original scenario, i.e., under NGN 
conditions, the distance-related element falls to somewhere between 20 cents and zero; the closer 
to zero, the more competitive, ceteris paribus, country B becomes.   
 
The prospective ability of NGNs to facilitate greater competition and cross-border trade in value-
added services is significant, both when considering directly the provision of value-added 
telecommunications services, but also in terms of the role of telecommunications as a facilitator 
for value creation and economic growth. But, as we have seen, the benefits to end-users are 
vulnerable to protectionist or inefficient regulation. Before examining this in more detail, it is 
helpful to look at the data on trade in telecommunications services. 
 
3.  Data on trade in telecommunications services 
 
Understanding statistics on trade in services is a challenge to which the authors have not yet fully 
risen.  The difficulties arise in part because of the four different modes of supply recognised 
under the GATS: cross-border trade (‘the service crosses the border’), consumption abroad (‘the 
consumer travels’), commercial presence (‘direct investment’) and presence of natural persons 
(‘an employee or self-employed person visits another country’). 
 
The two categories of trade in services of interest are ‘communications services’ and ‘computer 
and information services’.  The former has two major categories of transactions relating to 
international communications between residents and non-residents: 
 
•  postal and courier services; and 
MEC1636  10•  telecommunications, or ‘the transmission of sound, images and other information by 
telephone, telex, telegram, radio and television cable and broadcasting, satellite, 
electronic mail, facsimile services etc., including business network services, 
teleconferencing and support services.  It does not include the value of the information 
transported.  Excluded are …….. and database services and related consumer services to 
access and manipulate data provided by database services (included in “computer and 
information services”)’ (Manual, 2002, p.40). 
 
The OECD (2007b, Ch.8) also helpfully points out that exports of communications and 
telecommunications are growing but ‘a substantial percentage of traffic cannot be measured if it 
is carried over leased lines, as such lines do not pass through an international gateway.   
Moreover, telecommunications services which are transmitted in the form of IP packets sent over 
the Internet are not included. 
 
Computer information services include (i) computer services; (ii) news agency services; and (iii) 
other information provision services. 
MEC1636  11Our interest lies at the intersection of ‘telecommunications’ and ‘computer services’, but 
unfortunately these two categories are not always adequately distinguished in the data from their  
larger aggregates of ‘communications’ and ‘computer and information’ services. 
 
By far the largest expansion has occurred in computer and information services – a fifty-fold 
increase from 1990-2004, achieving a figure of $140bn by 2004.  Over the same period, 
communications (and telecommunications) services grew approximately five-fold, to $70bn and 
$20bn respectively in 2004. 
 
Among OECD members, the US was the largest importer and exporter of communications 
services but, in terms of exports as a percentage of GDP it was second lowest (Japan was lowest) 
in 2004.  By that metric (Luxembourg) was the highest by far, followed by Belgium and the 
Netherlands.  The OECD explains Luxembourg’s high figure (four times that of its nearest rival) 
as being caused by ‘the size of the banking sector in Luxembourg and the scope of the related 
information and communications technologies [which] foster extremely intensive ways of 
outbound telephone service.’ [ibid] 
 
It seems that two possible conclusions can be drawn from these data, with difficulties in the way 
of discriminating between them.  Either the data are not reliable, and disguise a large and possibly 
increasing amount of by-pass of trade statistics – for reasons give above.  Or the relatively low 
growth rates within the OECD of trade in communications services between 1999 and 2004 (a 
CAGR of 4%) suggests the existence of barriers to trade. 
 
 
MEC1636  124.  Barriers in trade in telecommunications-based services caused by 
 defective  regulation 
 
As discussed above, telecommunications provide a basis for the exploitation of country or 
regional advantages in production and the exploitation of comparative advantage and, 
consequently, economic growth, with the deployment of NGNs increasing the possibility for 
such.  Economic efficiency is key to maximising such effects; where economic efficiency is not 
attained – either through market failure or through inappropriate or  ineffective regulatory 
intervention – then the ability to generate economic growth through such means is constrained. 
 
At the heart of economic efficiency is the establishment of prices consistent with the efficiently-
incurred costs of service provision.  Where cross-border trade is required to exploit comparative 
advantage, the price of non-traded telecommunications conveyance plays an important role in 
limiting the extent of cross-border trade and by extension, the extent to which comparative 
advantage can be fully exploited in the interests of economic growth. 
 
International economic law might be able to get a purchase on this problem, for example via the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Annex on Telecommunications and regulatory Refeence Paper 
– see Kariyawasam (2007). However it is highly unlikely that it can operate at the level of detail 
necessary to examine and control the price and non-price terms of supply of particular wholesale 
products. Accordingly the following discussion is based on the application of national sector-
specific telecommunications law and regulation. 
 
Regulatory intervention can take numerous forms, depending on the (prospective) market failure 
which is being addressed and the nature of the party or parties involved.  However, in this 
MEC1636  13context, those which are most likely to affect (i) telecommunications sector value add directly and 
(ii) the extent of cross-border trade – and hence the ability to exploit comparative advantage – 
are: 
 
1.  prices in excess of efficient levels (and, by extension, volumes below efficient levels); 
and 
2.  lack of supply on the part of (typically) the incumbent operator, thereby constraining 
output and the ability to optimise use of the telecommunications network. 
 
The 2003 European regulatory framework was established in order to provide greater consistency 
in policy and regulation across the EU member states. A key characteristic of this framework is 
the systematic process in specifying regulatory measures.  This process is characterised by three 
distinct phases: 
 
1.  market definition, wherein the market under consideration is defined under the principles of 
competition economics; 
2.  considering, within the defined market definition, whether an operator (or operators) holds a 
position of Significant Market Power (SMP) (individually or jointly); and 
3.  only having established SMP, regulation is then specified in order to address the (prospective) 
market failures resulting from SMP. 
 
In addition to being required to adhere to this process in establishing regulation, National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) must choose from a list of possible regulatory measures – 
referred to as ‘remedies’ – with this list covering a range of measures including (i) mandating 
access to services and / or facilities and (ii) imposing cost orientation obligations in respect of 
regulated prices.  As a consequence, NRAs have the tools at hand to address the possible 
MEC1636  14concerns raised above by establishing regulation which effectively mimics the outcome of a 
competitive process.  However, in practical terms, there exist a number of factors which will 
impact or constrain the theoretical outcome, including: 
 
1.  the status of different players in the market, and the stage of market evolution.  An example is 
the use of glidepaths in setting price controls for regulated services where prices are above 
cost at the beginning of the regulatory period, with such measures used to prevent shocks to 
the revenue structure of the operator and achieve a balance between price reductions and 
financial impacts; 
2.  information asymmetries, in terms of both available data and capacity of regulatory 
authorities to analyse and process data in order to arrive at appropriate forms and levels of 
stringency of regulatory intervention.  These are discussed in a trade setting by Martimort and 
Verdier (2007) who analyse a small open economy upon which is grafted a number of non-
tradable inputs produced under monopolistic conditions. These markets are subject to 
regulation by a monopolist which has to ‘buy’ privately held competition relating to the 
firms’ efficient costs by conceding above-cost prices. As a consequence, the exploitation of 
comparative advantage changes is reduced in a similar way is it would change of there were 
the same way that it would if there were no regulation. 
3.  asymmetric risk, insofar as – in the face of complexity and informational asymmetries – the 
risk of over-regulating (either in terms of regulating those areas where competition may be 
effective, or in terms of applying over-stringent regulation, for example in terms of stringency 
of price controls) may be considered to be more significant than that of under-regulating to 
the extent that over-regulating may cause financial distress and establish longer-term 
disincentives to invest, whereas under-regulating may mean prices somewhat higher than 
otherwise would be the case but a stronger incentive to invest. 
 
MEC1636  15It is important in this context to recognise that an inappropriate absence of regulation – for 
example where market power is not identified due to absent or incomplete information – may be 
even more damaging to economic efficiency than sub-optimal regulation, since it potentially 
provides an opportunity for the dominant operator in question to profit maximise and / or 
foreclose entry to the detriment of the market and, ultimately, end users. 
 
The diagrams below compare price information across EU member states (European 
Commission, 2007d and 2008
5).  The tables show prices for (i) leased circuit local ends, (ii) full 
unbundled local loop (LLU) and (iii) shared access charges, all of which are used to provide 





                                                      
5 European Commission (2008), except for leased line part circuit data, only available in this format from 
European Commission (2007b). 
6 Where wholesale broadband offerings are concerned, the access prices are underpinned by full 
unbundling or shared access services to provide the broadband access offer. 








MEC1636  17These access products, which are typically subject to price regulation and access obligations, 
represent the main non-traded inputs in the provision of telecoms services to the major classes of 
end users, including large corporate customers (through private circuits) and SOHO / SME 
business customers, as well as residential customers (via LLU and shared access to support 
wholesale broadband offerings).
7  In particular, in the context of this paper, such services are a 
central non-traded input in the provision of value-added telecoms services to corporate clients and 
where the issues associated with cross-border trade and comparative advantage are of particular 
relevance. 
 
It is clear that the detriment associated with imperfect – or inappropriately absent – regulation 
will depend upon two factors, namely: (i) the level of the ‘tariff’ – in this case the extent to which 
regulators, as a result of information asymmetry or transitional factors or for less respectable 
reasons such as  capture, allow prices to exceed costs for the non-traded input; and (ii) the 
proportion of the value added represented by that imperfectly regulated input. 
 
Whilst a detailed cross-country comparison of unit costs and prices is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we can provide broad illustration of price-cost comparisons by taking lowest prices as a 
rough proxy for cost-based prices.
8  So, by way of example, a comparison of EU average prices 
to, say, the average of the lowest three rates for the access products discussed above – by way of 
a cost proxy – yield the following illustrative ‘mark-ups’ of price over ‘cost’: 
 
                                                      
7 These correspond to the categories of  customers identified  in Section 1. 
8 Such an approach has been used in the past by the European Commission in establishing ‘best practice’ 
interconnection rates using benchmark price data across member states.  This analysis does not represent in 
any way a robust cross-country benchmarking exercise, which would seek to normalize for country-specific 
factors; it serves merely, with the graphs, to highlight the material differences in prices of key access 
services across member states. 
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Table 1 
Euros/month [1] 
EU weighted average 
[2] 
Lowest 3 average 
[3] = [1] / [2] -1 
Implied excessive price  
2km local end 
















Even adjusting for country-specific factors – such as differences in factor input costs and network 
cost drivers (such as population density) – there are clearly material differences in unit prices for 
comparable services across the sample set.  These differences may result from the above factors, 
or indeed be because NRAs have yet to grapple with the market failure at hand, with this being of 
particular concern in countries recently having joined the EU.  This suggests prices differ 
materially from cost and that – assuming over-regulation is avoided and that NRAs err on the side 
of caution – price are, on average, above the unit cost of service provision (or, to use the 
phraseology above, that regulators ‘buy’ private information to address information asymmetries 
in respect of operators’ cost).   
 
Furthermore, whilst consideration of prices – and specifically the extent to which prices are 
consistently set with reference to the underlying costs of efficient service provision – is of 
importance, it is also necessary to consider the extent to which access is not provided at all, in 
addition to whether it is provided at the right price.  As noted above, European NRAs have 
available to them the remedy of mandating access, and hence have the ability to tackle the most 
obvious or blatant attempts by SMP operators to foreclose competition through such means.   
However, more subtle – and more pervasive – is an approach of non-cooperation and non-price 
discrimination by the incumbent operator, thereby favouring its own downstream operations to 
the detriment of its competitors).  Such actions can include delay in service provision or the 
MEC1636  19quality of service and delay in ordering, processing and billing and can result in, effectively, the 
inability to provide an effective service for existing and prospective service providers.
9 
 
However, in addition to the existence of such anti-competitive practices, there also exist examples 
of proposed regulatory intervention which explicitly allow for such outcomes.  An example is the 
ongoing debate concerning limiting the degree of access which competitors should be entitled to 
have to NGN, in the interest of ensuring that they are built earlier than would otherwise be the 
case. 
 
Whilst the varied and often bespoke nature of corporate value-added services does not easily 
allow for an assessment of the proportion of value-added accounted for by the non-traded services 
referred to above, it is a reasonable assumption that they represent a material proportion of the 
total cost of service.  
 
Thus, combining these two likely characteristics – an excessive regulated (or indeed 
inappropriately unregulated) price impacting a significant proportion of the total value added – 
we can identify a potential risk that inefficient or absent regulatory intervention can result in the 
establishment of a significant barrier to trade.  By way of illustration, taking the ratio of prices to 
(rough proxies for) costs for access services in the table above, and assuming such services 
account for, say, 30% of total value added for corporate services, then the ‘efficiency advantage’ 
on the traded activity which a foreign competitor would have to exhibit in order to remain 
competitive is as shown in table 2 below. For example, where a competitor was obliged to 
                                                      
9 Such practices, whilst nothing new, have come to the fore in the context of broadband penetration and the 
access of LLU services by competing operators.  Ofcom, the UK NRA, considered this matter of such 
significance that it has worked with BT to establish a framework of operational separation in order that 
BT’s access business (now branded Openreach) is subject to an incentive to provide access of fair and 
equal terms to BT and others, and other regulatory bodies are following suit. 
MEC1636  20purchase a shared access line, accounting for 30% of total service costs, at 2.3 times the cost at 
which it was self-supplied to the incumbent, the competitor would have to be twice as efficient in 
providing the services which make up the remaining 70% of costs. 
 
Table 2 
Euros/month [3]   
Implied tariff 
[4] 
 Proportion of 
value added 
[5] = ([3] x [4] / (1- [4]) 
Required efficiency 
advantage 
2km local end 
















This is just arithmetic, but the European Commission’s own assessment of the timeliness and 
consistency of regulatory measures across Member States identifies concerns in this regard: 
 
‘Indeed, in a number of Member States there have been significant delays in the practical 
implementation of remedies, as well as divergence in the nature of the remedies chosen 
following completion of the market analyses and findings of significant market power 
(SMP).  These are key factors that in practice have restrained the framework from 




‘… the Commission’s report … found that, in a number of cases, the solutions which 
national regulators impose in order to remedy a lack of competition vary considerably, 
leading to the danger of a fragmentation of the internal telecoms market to the detriment 
of consumers and operators with pan-European business activities.’ 
 
MEC1636  21Such observations therefore present both immediate and longer-lasting effects.  In the near term, 
inconsistency and inefficiency in regulatory policy potentially limits both domestic competition 
and the extent to which cross-border trade across European member states can be used to exploit 
comparative advantage in order to maximise productive output and economic growth.  Further, in 
the longer term, under-consumption of telecommunications services – resulting from prices too 
high or lack of supply – may have a detrimental effect in incentives to invest in NGNs.  Indeed, 
this therefore risks a self-reinforcing negative effect: lower demand for telecoms services and, by 
extension, value added services which can be best provided over NGNs potentially results in a 
lower investment in NGNs than would other be the case, thereby restricting the extent to which 
the lower cost characteristics of NGNs can be used to exploit country- and region-specific 
comparative advantage to the benefit of growth in economic output. 
 
It is reasonable to ask what the consequences of the loss of trade might be. We attempt to make 
an ‘order of magnitude’ calculation here.
10  It is carried out by distinguishing two effects: a 
'demand-side' effect relating to the quality of service, capturing the greater willingness to 
pay of customers for seamless and higher quality services, and a 'supply-side' effect 
associated with both more competition in the supply of the service, and the exploitation 
of comparative advantage through trade in services.  These two effects are illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
                                                      
10 We are grateful to Dr Julian Tice for undertaking the calculations presented here. 
















For the purposes of the calculation, we assume a price elasticity of demand of -0.9.   Then  
if willingness to pay rises by 5% and costs
11 fall by 7.5%, user surplus increases by 8%, 
which, given the particular assumptions made here, amounts to 24% of expenditure
12. 
Table 2 below provides some basic sensitivity analysis showing how user surplus gains 
change with increasing willingness to pay and falling cost levels. 
 
 
                                                      
11 Defined as Long Run Average Costs, LRAC. 
12 These magnitudes are based in part upon the results of a questionnaire to which we have had access 
which was administered by INTUG, a business consumers’ representative group. 
MEC1636  23Table 3: Illustrative user surplus gains from unified markets 
                                                Greater Willingness to Pay 
  5%  10%  20%  30% 
7,50% 8%  13% 23% 33% 
12,50%  9%  14% 25% 35% 
25% 14% 20% 30% 41% 







To derive an order-of-magnitude estimate of what these numbers might entail, consider the 
following: in the EU in 2006, revenues from fixed and mobile telecommunications services 
amounted to some 300 billion euros. Suppose one-fifth of these fall into the category of services 
subject to or supporting gains from cross-border trade. Then the above estimate implies a gain in 
user surplus equal to something of the order of 15 billion euros per annum.      
 
5.   Possible institutional reforms 
 
Underlying this paper are two propositions: firstly that the ‘death of distance’ is changing in a 
radical fashion the scope for trade (in the sense of cross-border trade, not Foreign Direct 
Investment, FDI) in telecommunications services and other services which they enable; secondly, 
that the limitations of regulation in the United States of Europe are preventing the benefits of such 
trade from being realised, whereas they are realised in the United States of America. 
 
We have illustrated the proposition by looking at one marketplace in particular: that for 
telecommunications services provided to corporate customers, typically multinational companies.  
But we are aware that other services which rely on telecommunications services, such as payment 
systems or off-shore gambling will raise similar issues. 
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Trade in such services will yield the classic benefits from comparative advantage and 
specialisation, lower prices and differential services.  However, regulatory failures can prevent 
the realisation of these gains. The illustrative calculation above shows that they might be 
significant in Europe.  This suggests, in the first instance, that regulators must be armed with the 
right information upon which to make decisions, both about what should and should not be 
regulated and, where intervention is necessary, its appropriate form, stringency and longevity.  It 
also suggests that regulators must be sufficiently skilled to use this information in the right way, 
with this potentially being a particular challenge in those countries which have recently joined the 
EU.  These points are particularly important in a world of Next Generation Networks, where large 
sunk investments are being considered, and supply-side (e.g. cost structure) and demand-side 
dynamics pose significant uncertainties.   
 
However, our main conclusion is that European regulators should be more alive to the new 
possibilities and take the necessary steps to allow the emergence of genuinely international trade, 
in the first instance at least, in pan-European markets.  So doing has the opportunity to unlock 
significant benefits accruing from the exploitation of country- or region-specific comparative 
advantage across the European Union. 
 
What institutional reforms to European regulation would have this effect?
13 The three stages 
required of regulators in implementing the European framework were noted in Section 4 above: 
market definition, market analysis and remedies if SMP is found. The NRAs’ conclusions with 
respect to the first two are subject to a power of veto by the European Commission – a power 
                                                      
13 For reasons set out above, we confine ourselves here to this form of amendment of the present system, 
and do not discuss the fuller application of international trade law.  
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on a dozen or so occasions, out of many hundreds of examples. But this under-estimates the effect 
of the power, since almost all NRAs seek pre-notification meetings with the Commission, the 
effect of which, in many cases, is to cause amendments to the actual notification.  However, the 
same power of veto does not apply to remedies, even though the Commission often comments on 
them.  This division of labour emerged as a compromise when the regulatory regime was 
developed in 2002. The NRAs undertook work within the framework European Regulators’ 
Group, or ERG (the ‘college’ of NRAs) to achieve consistency on remedies (ERG 2003). 
  
When the Commission published its proposals for revisions in 2007, they included a proposal to 
strengthen  its own supervision of remedies, noting that some commentators were asking ‘for a 
stronger role for the Commission in order to avoid a “lowest common denominator” approach, 
seen by some as inherent in a regulatory mechanism that essentially relies on consensus among 
27 NRAs’. The Commission also proposed the creation of an independent European Electronic 
Communications Market Authority to advise it on matters relating to the single market, and to 
provide some sort of for its interventions on remedies.  (European Commission 2007a, pp. 9-10). 
 
These proposals elicited significant opposition from the NRAs and Member State governments, 
as well as amendment by the European Parliament.  As a result, it is unlikely that the Commission 
will get a veto on remedies.  It is more likely, however, that some version of the independent 
authority or a strengthened ERG will exercise a greater degree of control over them.  This might 
involve a greater use of benchmarking, which could lead to a greater degree of convergence in the 
currently diverse numerical values of access prices analysed in section 3 above.  However, it is 
also necessary that any greater coordination of regulation across member states avoids the pitfalls 
associated with consistency for consistency’s sake – successful regulatory policy must reflect the 
MEC1636  26specificities and idiosyncracies of individual markets and countries, and keep the principle of 
proportionality at the heart of decision-making. 
  
Given the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of remedies, this may be all that is 
practicable. As a result, the barriers to trade identified above are likely to persist, but to operate at 
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